A verifiable execution record is a cryptographically signed, immutable sequence of agent steps that enables auditors to prove what occurred during a run. Catalyst signs each step with a unique key, chaining them for tamper-evidence. External parties can replay the record to independently verify outcomes. However, the record confirms execution integrity, not the correctness of the agent’s decisions.
Catalyst ensures tamper-evidence by signing each step record with a private key and chaining hashes between steps. This creates a cryptographically linked chain where altering any step breaks the hash chain and invalidates subsequent signatures. External verifiers can detect tampering by recomputing hashes and checking signatures against a public key. The record’s integrity relies on key security; compromised keys undermine the proof.
An auditor can replay an agent run from the verifiable record if they have the initial state and step inputs. The record provides signed step outputs, allowing deterministic replay to confirm that outputs match. Non-deterministic steps may diverge; verifiability covers the execution trail, not the original environment. The replayed proof validates that the run followed the recorded steps, not that the business logic was correct.
Anyone with the public verification key can verify the integrity of a Catalyst agent execution. The public key, distribution of records, and the verification protocol allow external parties like auditors or regulators to independently check the signed step chain. Verification confirms the record hasn’t been tampered with, but does not attest to the agent’s decision quality or that all relevant steps were captured.
A verifiable execution record provides cryptographically proven, tamper-evident evidence of step-by-step execution, unlike logs or traces which are observational and mutable. Logs record events for debugging and operational monitoring; traces show request flow for performance analysis. The verifiable record chains signed steps to allow third-party proof of what executed, without relying on the logging infrastructure’s integrity. It complements logs but adds non-repudiation.
Durable execution ensures the agent runs to completion despite failures; verifiability provides cryptographic proof that the completed run happened exactly as recorded. Where durability guarantees forward progress, verifiability enables retrospective audit and tamper-detection. Together they offer both reliability and accountability. However, verifiability does not prevent execution errors or misbehavior; it only makes the run’s trail provably intact, without evaluating decision correctness.
A signed step record includes the step input, output, and a hash of the execution context. The payload is signed with a key bound to the agent identity, ensuring integrity and origin. This structure enables independent verification without external systems, but the signature does not validate the correctness of the agent's decision logic.
An auditor can verify that the recorded sequence of steps is intact and unaltered, using cryptographic signatures and hash chaining. The record provides tamper-evident proof of what events occurred. However, it does not contain business-level validation rules, so the auditor cannot conclude whether the agent acted correctly—only that the record faithfully represents those actions.
At invocation, Catalyst captures a digital fingerprint of the agent's codebase, configuration, and prompt, embedding it into the execution record. This binds the run to that exact version, enabling precise replay. The binding relies on the referenced artifacts remaining available; if they are lost, replay fidelity may degrade.
Verifiable records provide tamper-proof technical evidence of execution, but they are not automatically sufficient as compliance artifacts. Regulations like SOX often require additional business-level attestation, such as human approval or control attestations. The record's integrity helps, but compliance demands broader process controls and non-repudiation mechanisms beyond raw execution data.
Catalyst signs each step with an identity that reflects the acting component—such as a specific model version, a tool, or a human user—based on attested credentials. These identities become part of the verifiable record, linking actions to actors. The strength of attribution depends on the underlying identity system; Catalyst does not itself enforce strong authentication for human users.
For non-deterministic steps like LLM calls, Catalyst captures the exact output and signs it as part of the step record. Verifiability ensures the output's integrity and origin, proving what was received at that step. However, an auditor cannot expect a replay to generate the same output, because the model's response is not deterministic by nature. The record thus proves provenance, not repeatability.
Catalyst chains step records with cryptographic hashes to prevent undetected reordering. Each signed step includes the hash of its predecessor and a sequence number, creating a verifiable linked list. Verification checks that the chain is intact, confirming no steps were inserted, removed, or reordered. However, this ordering proof relies on the integrity of the initial step; if that step is falsified, the entire chain could be suspect.
Catalyst signs step records using asymmetric cryptography; typical implementations rely on Ed25519 or ECDSA with SHA-256 hashing. Each step’s payload, metadata, and predecessor hash are hashed and signed, producing a detached signature that can be verified without the signing key. However, the strength of the evidence depends on the security of the key management and the chosen elliptic curve.
Yes, by including a cryptographic hash of the response within the signed step record. The hash binds the step to that specific response; an auditor can verify the hash against a retained copy of the payload without storing the payload in the record itself. However, this only proves the payload’s integrity if the hash collision resistance of the algorithm holds, and the auditor has the exact original response.
Catalyst’s verifiable records are self-contained; an auditor can verify signatures and hash chains using only the public key and the record data, without connecting to the runtime. The record includes all necessary step payloads and signatures. However, offline verification still assumes the public key is authentic and that the record hasn’t been truncated; a complete chain from genesis is required for full confidence.
Replay can only produce the same outcome if Catalyst captures the query result as part of the step’s input. By recording the exact data returned at execution time, the verifiable record allows deterministic replay. If the data wasn’t captured, replay may yield different results, because the external state may have changed. Auditors should confirm that all mutable inputs are recorded for faithful re‑execution.
The signed execution record typically includes the authenticated user’s identity as part of the initial invocation metadata, which is signed alongside the first step. This binds the whole run to the requester. However, identity binding assumes that authentication at the point of invocation was correct and that the user’s credentials haven’t been compromised; the record doesn’t independently verify the user’s identity.
Yes, the signed step record includes the model identifier and a cryptographic hash of the response. An auditor verifies the hash against the recorded data, confirming the model version was invoked without needing the live endpoint. This approach does not validate the model’s internal weights, guarantee response correctness, or prove that the endpoint configuration was unaltered; it only attests to the specific request-response pair that occurred. Moreover, if the model provider serves a different model under the same identifier, the hash would not detect that.
Catalyst records every step invocation attempt, including exception objects or error signals, as signed entries. A silent failure produces a step record with a failure outcome, while an unexecuted branch leaves no record. The verifiable record therefore captures execution intent, but only your agent code can define what constitutes a failure. Additionally, if a step failure is not explicitly signaled by the agent runtime, Catalyst cannot distinguish it from a successful no-op.
Catalyst signs a cryptographic hash of the binary artifact alongside its metadata, not the raw bytes. The verifiable record stores the hash and a retrieval identifier; the full artifact must be preserved externally. This enables tamper-evidence without bloating the record, but verification requires the auditor to possess a copy of the original artifact. If the external storage is compromised, the verifiability of the artifact content breaks down. Furthermore, the hash alone does not prove the artifact was genuine at execution time; it only proves integrity of the stored artifact.
Catalyst signs each step independently and embeds causal ordering via cryptographic pointers to predecessor steps, not through wall-clock timestamps. This creates a directed acyclic graph of step hashes that preserves the concurrency structure and prevents undetected reordering. It does not certify the relative timing of interleaved events. The verifiable record proves which steps happened before others, but cannot show the exact real-time overlap of concurrent operations. Additionally, the causal graph depends on the agent correctly declaring dependencies; missing a dependency may result in a valid but misleading verification.
The record can prove that the agent made specific API calls at recorded steps, but does not inherently monitor service-side rate limiting. If the agent receives a rate-limit error response, that error is signed as part of the step. An auditor can conclude that the agent received a rate-limit response, not whether the limit was actually exceeded by the provider. Additionally, if the agent retries and succeeds, only the final outcome may be visible unless retry attempts are explicitly recorded, and the record cannot prove the rate-limit policy was correct.
Yes, Catalyst includes a cache-hit indicator in the step metadata when a cached response is used. The record remains signed and verifiable, but it only proves that the step used a cached value, not that the cache was fresh. The auditor sees the provenance identifier, which may be a pointer to the original step’s hash. Moreover, if the original step is later invalidated due to model drift, the cache hit does not automatically become invalid; verification still succeeds.
Previously recorded executions remain verifiable if the key compromise is detected and the key is promptly revoked, because Catalyst signs each step record individually and appends it to a transparency log with trusted timestamps. The log’s append-only property ensures immutability. However, an auditor must trust the timestamp service and that the key was indeed revoked before any forged records could be created.
Catalyst appends a signed record to a durable log before beginning a step, ensuring that a crash only omits steps that never started. The log’s sequence and signatures allow a verifier to replay up to the crash point. However, this does not prove that a step’s side effects were fully applied; external systems may have partially executed. Confirm side effects by checking those systems.
The record proves only which steps were executed, not which were skipped. An auditor can conclude that a given API was not called because no signed step record references it, but they must trust the record’s completeness. Catalyst’s record lacks explicit ‘non-invocation’ proofs; absence of evidence is evidence of absence only if the record is known to be complete and unaltered. This limitation means auditors should not rely solely on the record for negative assertions about external interactions.
Yes, Catalyst signs steps with standard algorithms such as ECDSA and publishes the record format. An auditor can verify step signatures using any open-source crypto library that supports these primitives. However, re-running the agent to validate the outcome requires access to the exact agent code and model versions; Catalyst’s runtime normally handles this, so independent replay may be complex but signature verification alone is straightforward.
A Catalyst record is a per-run, chain-of-custody log with step-level signatures, not a distributed consensus ledger. It relies on a centralized signing authority rather than Byzantine fault tolerance, offering verifiability with lower latency and cost. However, trust shifts to the signing service’s correct operation and key management; it does not provide the decentralized trust model of a blockchain. It is optimized for single-agent audit trails, not multi-party consensus.
Catalyst stores verifiable records as an append-only binary log embedding JSON metadata and per-step signatures. Entire runs can be exported for archival; an auditor needs only the log file and the public key. The format lacks built-in encryption, so confidentiality requires additional measures. For longevity, monitor algorithm strength; periodic re-signing with current algorithms may be necessary to maintain verifiability. Consider migration to post-quantum algorithms in the future.
No, a verifiable record authenticates recorded steps cryptographically, but cannot prove absence of unrecorded steps. The chain of signatures ensures that within the record, no step is omitted or reordered. However, if the agent process fails to commit a step before crashing, that omission remains outside the record’s scope; completeness depends on runtime durability, not verifiability.
Yes, Catalyst constructs the chained signature step-by-step, so a partially complete record can be verified up to the latest signed step. This enables near-real-time integrity checks. However, the partial record does not prove that the execution will complete successfully; it only confirms the integrity of steps recorded so far. Finality requires all steps to be committed and the record closed.
A verifiable record contains a cryptographically chained sequence of step hashes, not just a single signature on the whole document. This provides per-step tamper-evidence and allows replay of intermediate states. A signed JSON document only authenticates the final payload and offers no partial verification or step-level proof of order. Catalyst leverages structured signatures for granular auditability.
No, the record proves what calls were made and with which parameters, but cannot prove that data not in the parameters was not leaked through other means such as side channels or misconfigured logging. An auditor can confirm that the recorded API interactions did not include sensitive fields, but they cannot assert absolute absence of leakage without analyzing the entire system.
Catalyst records the seed or hash of the entropy source used in non-deterministic steps, signing it as part of the step’s input. This allows a replayer to reproduce exactly the same random sequence. However, if the entropy comes from an external True Random Number Generator, the seed may not be reproducible; verifiability then relies on recording the actual random bytes, which increases record size.
The auditor trusts that the signing key was managed securely by Catalyst and not compromised, that the key corresponds to the claimed environment, and that the record was generated by a genuine Catalyst runtime. Verifiability does not remove the need to trust the infrastructure’s key handling and the authenticity of the execution environment. The record provides cryptographic integrity, not environmental proof.
No, it proves that recorded steps are authentic and in order, not that the agent’s decisions were error-free. Catalyst creates a tamper-evident chain by signing each step’s input and output hash. Replay verifies that outputs follow deterministically from inputs, but logical flaws, model biases, or off-by-one errors are invisible. The record is a witness to what happened, not a judge of its quality.
No, it only captures actions that pass through the Dapr sidecar, such as service invocations, state operations, and pub/sub messages. Direct file I/O, raw network calls, or system commands are not automatically included. To achieve full verifiability, you must design the agent to route every side effect through Dapr, making the record’s scope a conscious architectural choice. The verifiable record is a complete ledger only for Dapr-mediated interactions; any bypassing code leaves blind spots.
Catalyst focuses on post hoc integrity: it signs each step, creating a tamper-evident log. In contrast, TEEs provide hardware-enforced guarantees that code and data remain confidential and unmodified during execution. Catalyst verifiability alone does not prevent an adversary from manipulating the agent process; it only makes the manipulation detectable if the resulting steps are anomalous. For strong runtime guarantees, combine Catalyst with a TEE.
Yes, the record contains the exact order of signed steps, enabling comparison against a required workflow. Each step is hashed and linked to its predecessor, so any deviation in sequence is visible. However, the record only reflects what the agent actually did; it cannot prove that the agent’s logic would always follow the workflow under all conditions. It is evidence of that specific run, not a guarantee of perpetual compliance.
